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 A Requiem for US AC
 Kenneth L. Kraemer and John Leslie King
 The USAC program was the largest federal-local joint project yet under-
 taken to develop a major prototype technology for use in urban manage-
 ment - the integrated municipal information system. The authors evalu-
 ate the USAC program's philosophy, impacts , successes and failures,
 and policy implications, with the intent of providing a comprehensive
 overview of the meaning and lessons of USAC. The USAC program was
 largely a failure in accomplishing its stated objectives, but as an experi-
 ment it provides valuable insight into the difficulties of organizing and
 carrying out major technological development and diffusion efforts in
 the public sector.
 T Ahe Ahe USAC program, an innovative and controversial federally-
 supported experiment in development of urban information systems,
 came to an official end on 7 January 1977 ( USAC stands, some-
 what cryptically, for t/rban Information Systems Inter-Agency
 Committee). Thus concluded an important federal-local cooper-
 ative program that achieved national and international recognition
 among professionals and academics in the fields of urban manage-
 ment and information systems. During its seven-year life USAC was
 characterized by an expenditure of nearly $26 million in federal and
 local government money; an ambitious program involving research
 and development (R&D), implementation, and evaluation; a unique,
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 formally established working arrangement of city governments, in-
 formation system consultants, and universities; and an inventive
 overall program structure built around a consortium of ten federal
 agencies interested in development of urban information systems.1
 The passing of USAC signals the end of a significant era in the evo-
 lution of urban information systems, and, moreover, the end of a
 whole format for federal assistance to local governments.
 This paper provides a critical assessment of the USAC experi-
 ment. It includes (1) an overview of the USAC program and its
 central concept of the "integrated municipal information system,"
 (2) an account of the progress of USAC site cities in urban infor-
 mation systems as compared with non-USAC cities, (3) an assess-
 ment of the validity of USAC concepts and the lessons learned from
 the USAC experience, (4) a discussion of the "systems conscious-
 ness" that formed the foundation of the entire USAC program, and
 that in the end accounted for many of its problems, and (5) a set
 of conclusions about the policy implications of USAC for other
 federal-local technology efforts.
 OVERVIEW OF USAC
 The USAC program was built around a program philosophy with
 specific strategies and goals, an institutional structure for execution
 of the program, and processes and projects for research and devel-
 opment.2
 USAC Philosophy, Innovation Strategy, and Goals
 USAC's underlying philosophy perceived local governments as
 major links in the overall governmental system. From the federal
 1. The federal agencies expended $20 million and the cities the other
 $6 million of the total expenditure. Of the federal agencies, HUD spent the
 most ($11.2 million) and HEW second most ($4.8 million). See USAC Sup-
 port Panel of the National Research Council, Local Government Information
 Systems: A Study of USAC and the Future Application of Computer Tech-
 nology (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Science, 1976), p. 9.
 2. For background information on USAC see Kenneth L. Kraemer, "The
 Evolution of Information Systems for Public Administration," Public Ad-
 ministration Review 29 (July-August 1969) : 389-402; idem, "USAC: An
 Evolving Intergovernmental Mechanism for Urban Information Systems De-
 velopment," Public Administration Review 31 (September-October 1971):
 543-51; idem, "Information in Urban Systems," International Review of
 Administrative Science 40 ( 1 974) : 3 - 1 5 ; and Barry Weilar, The Urban In-
 formation Systems Inter-Agency Committee (USAC) Experience: Some Les-
 sons Learned (Ottawa, Canada: Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 1973).
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 perspective, local governments serve as general instruments of gov-
 ernment through their roles as implementation vehicles for federal
 programs, as service sectors of increasing importance in the national
 economy, as data sources for federal program planning and evalu-
 ation, as delivery vehicles for urban services, and as coordinating
 mechanisms for comprehensive local planning. The USAC philoso-
 phy held that the importance of local governments warranted federal
 government assistance in improving local government planning,
 management, and operations.3 The USAC architects further be-
 lieved that the most promising tool for achieving this improvement
 was increased use of computers and automated information systems:
 information systems could automate routine information processing
 tasks, thereby improving productivity in the information-dependent
 field of local government management; they could be used in an-
 alysis and redesign of municipal goals and activities; they could in-
 tegrate data and data processing, creating a dynamic data base for
 use in planning, management, and integration of local operations.
 Ultimately, the designers of USAC felt that the use of computers
 could result in development of new sociotechnical systems offering
 increased local government efficiency and improved service delivery.
 As with other federally supported programs for demonstration of
 new technological ideas, USAC's innovation strategy came into
 existence because urban information systems experts believed that
 decentralized, private market mechanisms would not provide suf-
 ficient incentive for development of the technology in the interests of
 3. The intellectual antecedents for both the USAC Committee and the
 IMIS research and development program (to be discussed) were in research
 conducted at the University of Southern California, the University of Con-
 necticut, and the IBM-New Haven Project. See William H. Mitchell, "An
 Approach to the Use of Digital Computer in Municipal Government" (Ph.D.
 diss., University of Southern California, 1968); Municipal Systems Research
 Project, The Municipal Information and Decision System Project (Los An-
 geles: University of Southern California, School of Public Administration,
 1968), Phase One, Final Report, and Overview; Municipal Information Tech-
 nology Program, A Regional Municipal Information Handling Service for
 the Capital Region, 2 vols. (Hartford, Conn.: University of Connecticut,
 Institute of Public Service, and the Travelers Research Center, 1967); IBM-
 City of New Haven Joint Information System Study Staff, An Urban Man-
 agement Information System, 32 vols. (New Haven, Conn., 1969). An ex-
 cellent review of these and other related projects is Barry S. Weilar, "Eval-
 uation of Major Research and Development Efforts, in The Wichita Falls
 Consortium Phase I Report, NTIS PB 206 789-18 (Springfield, Va.: National
 Technical Information Service, 1970), vol. 4, Project Related Research.
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 cities or the intergovernmental system.4 Therefore USAC could not
 rely upon passive development and diffusion provided by the exist-
 ing private market mechanisms, and undertook an active promo-
 tional role.
 Active promotion of innovation development and diffusion re-
 quires adoption of one or both of the incentive systems relied on
 in passive development and diffusion under successful market con-
 ditions.5 Passive development and diffusion of innovation typically
 depends on supply-push incentives, in which innovations are devel-
 oped in the self-interest of developers and "marketed" to prospective
 users based on their purported benefits; or on demand-pull incen-
 tives, in which a technical fix is literally pulled into existence and
 adopted on the basis of existing demand. Counterpart strategies are
 used in active development and diffusion projects. The supply-push
 strategy typically utilizes publicly funded demonstration projects
 and financial incentives to entice users into adopting demonstrated
 innovations. The demand-pull strategy essentially relies on creation
 of an "artificial" demand somewhere in the future that requires users
 to respond by developing and adopting innovations that will help
 them meet the demand. The premier examples of this are found in
 the automobile manufacturing industry, where the federal clean air
 and fuel economy mandatory standards act, in effect, as "pulleys"
 that allow public policy to "pull" technological development and
 diffusion toward desired goals.
 USAC relied principally on the supply-push strategy for develop-
 ment and diffusion, based on the assumption that there was an exist-
 ing demand for the products of USAC and that the USAC products
 would be transferable at a sufficiently low cost to entice many local
 4. Three factors are usually associated with this kind of market failure:
 private profits are inadequate even though social benefits might be great; un-
 certainties about the technology make the investment too risky, despite po-
 tential private profits; and nontechnological obstacles, such as regulation,
 political opposition, or public resistance, make success too uncertain. See
 Walter S. Baer, Leland L. Johnson, and Edward W. Merrow, "Government-
 Sponsored Demonstrations of New Technologies." Science 196 (27 May
 1977): 950.
 5. See Edwin Mansfield, The Economics of Technological Change (New
 York: Norton, 1968); R. R. Nelson, M. J. Peck, and E. D. Kalachek, Tech-
 nology, Economic Growth, and Public Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
 Institution, 1967); R. R. Nelson and S. G. Winter, "Growth Theory from an
 Evolutionary Perspective," American Economic Review 65 (1975): 338-44.
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 governments to acquire them to meet their information needs. The
 federal government would underwrite most of the cost of prototype
 development and would provide financial assistance for transfer of
 the systems. A long-range demand-pull aspect to the USAC strategy,
 however, called for development of federal and local information
 standards that would in time practically require governments to
 adopt USAC components in order to be in compliance with the
 standards.
 The goals of USAC, then, were to provide funds as an incentive
 for research and development in application of information systems
 to urban management, to ensure the technical quality and practical
 utility of the resultant information systems applications, to assist in
 transferring the developed applications to non-USAC cities, to co-
 ordinate and provide a focus for the many non-USAC federal pro-
 grams in the area of urban information systems, and eventually to
 build toward an intergovernmental information network.
 Institutional Structure of USAC
 To accomplish USAC's goals, the initiators of USAC developed
 two institutional structures: one programmatic and at the federal
 level; the other project-specific for each selected experimental site.
 The programmatic structure was developed as a contractual con-
 sortium called the USAC Committee, made up of ten federal agen-
 cies, all of which had programs and/or interests in development and
 use of urban information systems.6 All ten agencies contributed
 money and personnel time to the program. For ease of management
 a single agency, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
 opment (HUD), was chosen as the lead agency for the program. In
 theory, the committee was to provide policy guidance for the pro-
 gram, while the program management group in HUD (consisting of
 6. The federal agencies in USAC were HUD, HEW, the Department of
 the Army's Office of Civil Defense, the Department of Commerce, the De-
 partment of Justice, the Department of Labor, the Department of Transpor-
 tation, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Office of Management and
 Budget, and the National Science Foundation. For more detail on the USAC
 Committee and USAC plans, see Kramer, "USAC: An Evolving Intergovern-
 mental Mechanism"; and William H. Mitchell, "After USAC, What?" in
 Urban and Regional Information Systems Association Conference Proceed-
 ings (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University, Center for Urban Regionalism,
 1969), pp. 415-22.
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 program consultants, federal bureaucrats, and representatives from
 the major urban public interest groups) was to execute this policy
 and manage the program. Thus USAC had three innovative pro-
 grammatic characteristics: it used a temporary matrix organiza-
 tional structure, borrowed from the defense and aerospace industry;
 it used a set of contracts as a mechanism for creating and maintain-
 ing its program structure; and it used the unique tool of a formal but
 temporary interagency organization to provide the statutory basis
 for "pooling" of money from the nine agencies.
 At the local level each city chosen as a site acted as the lead
 agency for a smaller local consortium made up of three parties: the
 city government itself, which served as the site for the R&D; a com-
 puter software development firm, which provided the technical and
 knowledge resources for the R&D; and a university, which served to
 monitor and evaluate the progress of the local activity. These groups
 also were organized by means of contracts with each other and with
 HUD.
 In addition to the programmatic and local organizational struc-
 tures, temporary site visit teams were assembled from the member
 agencies of the USAC Committee and the program management
 group in HUD to visit and evaluate the local sites on a quarterly
 basis. An interconsortium panel made up of representatives from
 all the participants also was convened on a semiannual basis to ex-
 change information.
 The USAC Program for Research and Development
 USAC borrowed its model of the R&D process from the defense
 and aerospace industry. Essentially that model posited the USAC
 information systems objectives as products moving through a staged
 process from product specification, to prototype development, to
 transfer demonstration, to widespread diffusion. Municipal informa-
 tion systems were to be the first of several products developed by
 USAC through this process. Information systems for other local
 jurisdictions and for interfacing these jurisdictions with state and
 federal agencies were to follow. Municipalities were chosen as the
 first object for R&D because they were viewed as the basic building
 blocks for intergovernmental systems.
 Integrated Municipal Information Systems - USAC's first pro-
 gram was to conduct R&D into a concept called integrated munici-
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 pal information systems (IMIS). Seven key concepts underlaid the
 IMIS program.7
 • Total systems and subsystems , which postulated building of a
 total municipal information system based on four functional sub-
 systems, representing public safety, public finance, physical and
 economic development, and human resources development.
 • Integrated data processing, which suggested that all data in an
 IMIS be conceived of logically as a single data base, constructed
 both "vertically" to encompass each municipal function, and
 "horizontally" around the principal objects of people, property,
 money and personnel that cut across municipal functions. Inte-
 gration further suggested that data processes be interrelated logi-
 cally and physically such that one process automatically trigger
 another when appropriate.
 • Operations-based automation , which held that most data required
 for municipal planning and management existed in the practical,
 operational data files of municipal agencies, and that the sensible
 way to provide planning and management data was as a by-
 product of operational automation. A single source could be iden-
 tified for generation of each data element, thus optimizing data
 generation.8
 • The prototype development process, consisting of systems analysis,
 systems conceptualization, systems design, systems development,
 systems implementation, and systems evaluation. This process
 7. These seven concepts and others were set forth in a request for pro-
 posals issued by USAC. They were subsequently elaborated further in a book
 and in a collection of papers dealing with USAC concerns. See U.S., Depart-
 ment of Housing and Urban Development, "Municipal Information Systems,"
 RFP H-2-70 (Washington, D.C., 1970); and Kenneth L. Kraemer et al.,
 Integrated Municipal Information Systems (New York: Praeger Publishers,
 1974Ì.
 8. The USAC Committee did not expect that the routine operating ac-
 tivities of municipal departments would provide all the data required for
 planning and management. The committee recognized that some important
 data - for example, data about the larger urban region - could not be pro-
 vided by automation of routine operations but had to be generated indepen-
 dently. Some writers argued that the routine operating activities would pro-
 duce little or none of the information required for planning and management.
 See David Leninger, "Beyond USAC: Atlas Shrugged," Urban and Regional
 Information Systems Association Conference Proceedings , 1971, pp. 191-
 200; and George C. Hemmens, "Implementing the Integrated Municipal
 Informations Concept: The Charlotte, North Carolina Case," mimeographed
 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, Department of City and Re-
 gional Planning, 1975).
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 would proceed across the board on all subsystems up through the
 systems development phase, with incremental implementation fol-
 lowing.
 • Complete documentation, intended to provide data for research,
 to expedite the jump from analysis to implementation, and also to
 facilitate transfer of the prototypes.
 • Systems and subsystems transfer to other cities, intended to be
 encouraged by successful demonstration of the superiority of in-
 tegrated systems over previous independent systems. This required
 that the prototypes be designed and implemented to facilitate
 transfer.
 • The consortium approach, which, as mentioned above, made the
 city the prime contractor, with the systems development firm and
 the university as subcontractors to the city. The city would con-
 trol R&D and assign the project director; the systems firm would
 provide technical expertise and training; and the university would
 provide technical advice and evaluation.
 From the standpoint of research, it was expected that the projects
 would accomplish several tasks. They would define, for the first
 time, the complete data content and data processing environment of
 a municipal government, as well as the full potential scope and
 character of feasible automation in municipal government in keep-
 ing with the operational characteristics of "integrated" data process-
 ing. They also would develop solutions to problems in building sys-
 tems, including problems of data privacy and data access, and would
 assess the impacts, costs and benefits of the IMIS. From the stand-
 point of development, it was expected that the projects would en-
 gineer the parts of the IMIS and implement them both as subsystems
 in an operational setting, and as prototypes for transfer to other
 cities. Thus the projects were R&D, not simply research and not
 simply development.
 These concepts were embodied in a request for proposals (RFD)
 made available in 1970 to all interested cities having populations
 between 50,000 and 500,000.® Out of approximately 270 eligible
 cities, 79 submitted proposals. Awards were made in 1970 for total
 system projects to Charlotte, North Carolina, and Wichita Falls,
 Texas, and for subsystems to Dayton, Ohio (public finance), Long
 Beach, California (public safety), Reading, Pennsylvania (physical
 9. See request for proposals, "Municipal Information Systems."
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 and economic development), and St. Paul, Minnesota (human re-
 sources development) . The St. Paul project was discontinued early
 in the program due to problems discussed later in this paper.
 A Summary of USAC Experiences
 Nobody who initiated the USAC program or who bid on the
 USAC projects knew whether it was possible to do what was en-
 visaged in the RFP. But both the federal initiators and the local
 contractors (cities, systems firms, and universities) hoped to come
 sufficiently close to satisfying the objectives to make the program
 worth the investment. While the initial days of the project were
 filled with enthusiasm, the first of the many problems developed
 soon after the projects were awarded. Federal contract negotiations
 delayed the official start time, after which it took nearly nine months
 to recruit staff, to prepare space for the project, and to work out the
 details of relationships within each local consortium. Systems an-
 alysis, the first phase of the projects, took considerably more effort,
 money, and time than anticipated. The late start-up and the overruns
 during systems analysis put the project a year behind schedule, with
 25 percent of total project funds already spent.
 It soon became apparent to everyone involved that the R&D tasks
 were more complex than anticipated. The concepts embodied in the
 RFP were difficult to implement because they were new and no one
 was sure what they meant in practice. There were false starts and
 restarts and frequent changes of personnel. It also became apparent
 that some systems firms did not have the technical skills for the task
 and that key city staff members in the various functional depart-
 ments could not be made available to work on the projects as needed.
 Word about the projects spread and city staffs became deluged
 with inquiries and requests to visit the project. These visits, in addi-
 tion to the regular visits by federal officials and the interconsortium
 panel meetings, eventually became a large drain on project re-
 sources, and visits were curtailed in order for project work to
 progress. As the projects moved closer towards implementation of
 systems and applications, it was obvious that available time and
 money would not support full design, development, and implemen-
 tation of everything that had been conceptualized. The choice was
 between federal and local goals, between development priorities and
 research priorities. The cities naturally preferred local goals and de-
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 velopment priorities, and, since they were the key to further imple-
 mentation, their priorities won out. Thus the scope of development
 was greatly reduced.
 These reductions resulted in disappointment with and criticism of
 the USAC program both inside and outside the USAC family. To
 stem the tide of criticism over federal project management, USAC
 officials rigidly insisted upon adherence to the letter of the contracts
 and instituted a formal request procedure for continuation funding.
 HUD, as the principal federal agency, became concerned that the
 cities would change from their original plans, so it required the cities
 to submit new proposals indicating exactly what was planned. Be-
 cause the contracts were awarded to the cities on a year-to-year
 basis, and refunding was conditional on formally meeting HUD's
 requests and directives, the cities did not know for certain that they
 would receive the rest of the project money. The response of the
 local contractors to what had developed into a set of unreasonable
 expectations was to try anyway in the hope of coming sufficiently
 close to the original objectives that the government wouldn't cancel
 the contract, or better yet, would redefine the tasks to make them
 more reasonable.
 A great deal of the time of local project staff people was con-
 sumed in writing and rewriting proposals to HUD, and a substantial
 portion of project finances were spent in this unproductive activity.
 The project staffs became increasingly demoralized, and HUD grew
 weary of the burden of USAC. Eventually, the goal of all remaining
 parties to the USAC program became the same - to meet their
 formal obligations and officially to end the projects.
 Near the end of the IMIS projects in mid-1975, it was unclear
 whether the federal government should embark upon a program to
 test the transfer ability of the IMIS prototypes. The USAC Com-
 mittee had been dormant for two years and the individual federal
 agencies belonging to USAC had withdrawn all support, leaving
 HUD with the added burden of deciding whether a program to test
 the transferability of the IMIS prototypes should be undertaken.
 To assist in this decision, HUD commissioned an assessment of
 the IMIS projects by a special panel of experts in computer science,
 government, and information systems from the National Academy
 of Engineering (NAE). The NAE panel issued its report in mid-
 1976, concluding that USAC had had a significant impact on the
 development of information systems, but not the anticipated impact.
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 According to the panel, USAC had developed new knowledge about
 how to develop information systems, demonstrated the importance
 of involving elected and appointed officials in the development
 process, and pioneered in applying computer technology to a wide
 variety of municipal operations. The panel noted, however, that
 virtually no total systems had been transferred from the USAC cities
 to other local governments, and that the USAC program had had
 little impact on encouraging intergovernmental cooperation in the
 exchange of data.10
 Following this report, HUD officials decided to end the USAC
 program formally and completely, and on 7 January 1977 issued a
 "close-out" memorandum. USAC was officially over.
 STATUS OF USAC CITIES
 While the USAC program is over, much interest in it remains.
 Yet a satisfactory postmortem has been wanting. We here present
 the status of the USAC cities at the end of 1975, setting the scene
 for our analysis of the lessons to be learned from USAC.
 To be considered minimally successful, the USAC program should
 have improved the state of applications development, the state of
 computing capability, and the state of the computing environments
 in the USAC cities beyond what they would have been without the
 program. We use a simple framework to assess whether the USAC
 cities achieved such successes. The framework here longitudinally
 compares the USAC cities with the seventy-three cities that re-
 sponded to the USAC request for proposals but that did not receive
 awards (referred to in the tables as "RFP cities"), and compares
 both USAC and RFP cities with the 1975 status of similarly sized
 cities not involved in USAC at all (table 1). The data for these an-
 alyses are from a 1970 HUD survey of the seventy-nine cities that
 responded to the RFP, the 1975 survey made by the Urban Infor-
 mation Systems (URBIS) project, and our own follow-up inter-
 views.11
 10. USAC Support Panel, Local Government Information Systems, p. 2.
 11. URBIS is a four-year research project, studying the uses and impacts
 of computers in local government, conducted by the Public Policy Research
 Organization at the University of California, Irvine. This and other surveys
 are described in O. E. Dial et al., Municipal Information Systems: State of
 the Art 1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
 Development, 1971); and Kenneth L. Kraemer et al., "A Future Cities Sur-
 vey Research Design for Policy Analysis," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences
 10 (1976): 199-211.
 324 POLICY ANALYSIS
 Table 1. City Sizes, 1975: USAC, Non-USAC, and RFP
 i^- - - - - - ■ ---i - -g ======™
 Average Com-
 Average Average puting Budget
 Annual Number of as % of
 Average Operating City City Operating
 City Group
 USAC cities*
 RFP cities*» 244,709 86,094 4,065 1.18
 Non-USAC cities0
 a Populations of the individual USAC cities were: Charlotte, 285,000; Wichita Falls,
 96,000; Dayton, 214,000; Reading, 84,000; Long Beach, 347,000.
 b Includes seventy-three of the cities that responded to the USAC request for pro-
 posals; excludes the five USAC site cities chosen, as well as St. Paul, Minnesota.
 c Includes all URBIS cities, except the seventy-three RFP cities, the five USAC site
 cities, and St. Paul, Minnesota.
 State of Application Development
 Three measures summarize the state of application development
 in USAC cities: extent of automation, diversity or spread of auto-
 mation across municipal functions, and sophistication of automa-
 tion.
 Extent of automation (table 2) is measured by the average num-
 Table 2. In 1975, USAC Cities Surpassed Non-USAC and RFP Cities in Both
 Extent of Automation Diversity of Automation
 Average Number of
 Average Number of Municipal Functions
 Applications Operational Automated (32 Possible)11
 Cities (City Groups) 1970 1975 % Change 1970 1975 % Change
 Charlotte 20 57 +185 10 20 +100
 Wichita Falls 27 47 + 74 14 16 + 15
 All-USAC cities 20 46 +130 11 16 + 45
 RFP cities 16 43 +168 8 13 + 60
 Non-USAC cities
 « This excludes public education.
 ber of computer applications operational. This number increased by
 130 percent in the USAC cities between 1970 and 1975, and in the
 RFP cities by 168 percent. The USAC cities led the group in aver-
 age number of operational applications in 1975, with forty-six, com-
 pared to forty-three in RFP cities and twenty-eight in non-USAC
 cities.
 Diversity of automation (table 2) is measured by the number of
 municipal functions in which computing is applied. Among USAC
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 cities this number increased by 45 percent and among RFP cities by
 60 percent between 1970 and 1975. Again, USAC cities led in
 number of functional areas covered in 1975 with eighteen, while
 RFP and non-USAC cities had thirteen and ten, respectively.
 Sophistication of applications (table 3) is measured by the com-
 parative percentage of applications in each of six information pro-
 cessing tasks of varying sophistication. In both USAC and RFP
 cities the percentage of record-keeping and calculating/printing ap-
 plications decreased slightly, while the percentages of more sophis-
 ticated record searching, record restructuring, sophisticated ana-
 lytics, and process control applications all increased between 1970
 and 1975. Curiously, the USAC and RFP cities showed sophistica-
 tion comparable to the non-USAC cities in 1975.
 Unfortunately the data do not permit an assessment of the degree
 of application integration achieved in the USAC cities, the RFP
 cities, and the non-USAC cities. But our knowledge of the cities
 indicates that the USAC cities achieved much higher levels of in-
 tegration, both within and among applications, than most other
 cities in the United States. This is a partial explanation for the only
 slightly greater degree of automation achieved by the USAC cities
 (see above); integrated applications are far more difficult, costly and
 time-consuming to design and implement than conventional inde-
 pendent applications. Finally, the 1975 survey counted only oper-
 ational applications, and occurred before some of the final USAC
 applications were completed and began operating in the USAC
 cities.
 State of Computing Capability
 Changes in the state of computing capability brought to the USAC
 cities by the IMIS projects are indicated by three measures: tech-
 nical capacity (computer hardware and software), staff size, and
 expenditure for computing.
 Technical capability (table 4) is measured by total computing
 core capacity, presence of data-base management systems, and num-
 ber of on-line computing terminals. The data show that Charlotte,
 Wichita Falls, and Long Beach moved from small, primarily batch,
 computer systems to large on-line systems with extensive terminal
 deployment and advanced data management capability. Computer
 mainframe capacity increased by fifty-four times in Charlotte, twelve
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 Table 4. USAC and RFP Cities Made Major Gains in Computing Capacity
 BETWEEN 1970 AND 1975, AS COMPARED TO NoN-USAC CITIES
 Total Computing Total Number of
 Core Capacity Active Terminals
 City
 Charlotte 3 IK 2000K +5450 8 26 + 230
 Wichita Falls 40K 256K + 540 3 18 + 500
 All USAC cities 35K 1225K +2500 4 22 + 550
 RFP cities 61K 486K + 690 2 20 +1000
 Non-USAC cities N/A 292K N/A
 times in Long Beach, and six times in Wichita Falls. Dayton and
 Reading both registered significant gains in computing core size,
 but little change in the other indicators.
 Staff size (table 5) increased by 74 percent in the USAC cities
 Table 5. USAC Cities Made Major Increases in Number of Computing
 Employees and Expenditure on Computing between 1970 and 1975, as
 Compared to RFP and Non-USAC Cities
 Average Expenditure
 Average Number for Computing as a % of
 of Computing Employees City Operating Budget
 City
 Charlotte 32 59 +84 1.3 2.6 +100
 Wichita Falls 15 27 +80 2.8 6.6 +135
 All USAC cities 27 47 +74 1.24 3.27 +163
 RFP cities 21 31 +47 0.99 1.18 + 20
 Non-USAC cities N/A 11
 between 1971 and 1975, compared to only a 47 percent increase in
 the RFP cities. Staffs in the USAC cities in 1975 averaged forty-
 seven employees, while the RFP cities and non-USAC cities aver-
 aged thirty-one and eleven employees respectively.
 Expenditures for computing (table 5) in the USAC cities, mea-
 sured as a percentage of city operating budget, increased by 163
 percent from 1970 to 1975, compared to a 20 percent increase in
 the RFP cities. In 1975 USAC cities spent an average of 3.27 per-
 cent of their operating budgets for computing, compared to 1.18 in
 RFP cities and 0.97 percent in non-USAC cities.
 The state of computing capability in the USAC cities clearly was
 considerably advanced as a result of USAC, and this advance ap-
 peared in all the USAC cities. It is worth noting that these increases
 in computing capability greatly outshadowed analogous increases
 in applications development, indicating that much of USAC's re-
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 sources went for purposes other than fast implementation of large
 numbers of operational applications.
 State of the Government Environment
 Three impacts of the IMIS projects on the city environment can
 be noted. These impacts were not measured quantitatively, but were
 observed in visits to the cities and in interviews with key personnel
 from the USAC cities. First, because of time delays and the difficul-
 ties encountered in systems analysis and systems conceptualization,
 a number of IMIS applications were brought-up very quickly and
 too near the end of the projects. This created serious operational
 problems. Systems were not adequately debugged. Users were not
 well trained. Some systems were only partially finished. It has taken
 several years to fix up and redesign systems brought-up near the end
 of the projects.
 Second, initial enthusiasm for the projects turned to skepticism
 about computer-based information systems generally when it be-
 came clear that the projects' high expectations would not be met.
 Substantial effort at rebuilding support for computing in the USAC
 cities has been required to counter this skepticism.
 Third, independent study of selected applications done for USAC
 indicates that the IMIS projects provide net benefits for cities only
 if federal costs for research and development are excluded. Taken as
 a whole, USAC has resulted in a net cost to the cities that must be
 weighed against qualitative improvements, such as faster response in
 emergencies, easier response to citizen requests, new information
 available, and so forth. Cost-benefit analysis covering these factors
 has yet to be done.12
 Summary
 The primary impacts of USAC on the participating cities have
 been the expansion of computing capacity and staff size, the inte-
 gration of computer applications, and an increase in the operational
 12. A cost-benefit study aimed at answering questions about continuation
 of the USAC projects was performed by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Com-
 pany during 1973. The report looked only at in-progress activities of USAC
 in Charlotte and Long Beach, and was performed too early to fully evaluate
 the factors discussed in this paper. See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Com-
 pany, Final Report: Evaluation of the USAC Project (Springfield, Va.: Na-
 tional Technical Information Service, 1973).
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 and managerial problems of computing brought by the demands and
 complexities of the program. Although many of the applications en-
 visioned by USAC planners will probably eventually be built by the
 cities on their own, the development and implementation portions
 of the USAC goals were not reached within the life of the project.
 In development and use of computing, the two total-systems sites
 seem to be ahead of cities comparable to themselves and will prob-
 ably remain so due to their head start. But it is clear that all the RFP
 sites were among the more advanced cities in use of the technology
 to begin with.
 These data also indicate the impact of USAC on other cities not
 selected as USAC sites. The fact that the RFP cities (together with
 USAC sites) are in all cases so far ahead of non-USAC cities is in
 part due to a selection bias in the seventy-nine-city sample (that is,
 this sample represents cities most interested in USAC, and thus
 likely to be more advanced in computing). But we believe it is also
 due in part to the influence of the USAC RFP process on those cities.
 The extensive RFP process tended both to focus and to mobilize
 computerization efforts in those cities, and this mobilization in many
 cases carried on even after cities were excluded from the USAC
 projects. Thus the phenomenon of USAC had impacts beyond its
 programs.
 LESSONS LEARNED FROM USAC
 The most expedient way of evaluating the lessons of USAC is to
 assess what has been learned about the seven USAC concepts for
 integrated municipal information systems presented earlier. We will
 review each concept briefly and then assess it to determine whether
 the concept was realized, or at least demonstrated, and what the
 experience indicates for others.13
 The Concept of Total Systems and Subsystems
 USAC postulated that a total municipal information system was
 comprised of four major subsystems covering public safety, public
 13. This section draws upon our personal experience with the USAC pro-
 gram, discussions with USAC personnel, and the final project reports of the
 USAC cities. See Charlotte, N.C., Project Completion Report (Springfield,
 Va.: NTIS, 1975); Wichita Falls, Texas, Project Completion Report (Spring-
 field, Va.: NTIS, 1975); Dayton, Ohio, Final Project Report (Springfield,
 Va.: NTIS, 1975).
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 finance, physical and economic development, and human resources
 development. Several important lessons on this concept can be
 drawn from the USAC experience. Most important, it is now clear
 that the scope and complexity of building a total municipal informa-
 tion system is greater than originally thought. Conceptualizing ap-
 plication components was relatively easy, but the number of con-
 ceptualized components far outdistanced the number that could be
 implemented during the project, as shown in table 6. Charlotte con-
 ceptualized 108 components but implemented only 15; Wichita
 Falls conceptualized 115 components but implemented only 17.
 Charlotte implemented components in all four subsystems, whereas
 Wichita Falls concentrated its implementation in the public finance
 subsystem (13 out of 17 implemented components).14
 It is also now clear that the task of building municipal informa-
 tion subsystems is more manageable than that of building total sys-
 tems. Dayton implemented ten out of eleven conceptualized com-
 ponents in the public finance subsystem, and Long Beach imple-
 mented eleven out of its seventeen conceptualized components in the
 public safety subsystem. These subsystem projects benefited from
 their limited scope, which made the projects more manageable. They
 also benefited from a comparatively long time-frame for develop-
 ment, expanded from two to five years (+150 percent), and a level
 of funding that expanded from about $1 million to $3 million
 (+200 percent). These advantages provided the flexibility and
 slack resources needed to deal with the unexpectedly complex R&D
 problems encountered. In comparison, the total system projects had
 only a 25 percent increase in time and a 66 percent increase in
 funding support. If the total system projects had enjoyed expansions
 similar to those of the subsystem projects, they might have had more
 positive results.15
 Finally, the institutional character of the human resources de-
 velopment subsystem is much larger and more complex than was
 anticipated. The St. Paul project was doomed from the start, con-
 sidering the obstacles it faced. It would have had to enlist support
 14. It should be noted that Charlotte had implemented a set of major
 financial applications shortly before USAC, and thus chose to concentrate
 on other functional areas in addition to finance.
 15. Time, m particular, seems to be an important component m tne suc-
 cess of innovation efforts. See Baer, Johnson, and Merrow, "Government-
 Sponsored Demonstrations," p. 955.
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 and cooperation from over 150 public and private agencies provid-
 ing human services in the city. It would have encompassed a great
 many human services functions outside the city government's legal
 jurisdiction, including education, which by itself was an activity as
 large and complex as the city government. And it would have had
 to manage this morass through the mechanism of the local consor-
 tium, which in itself was sometimes unmanageable.16 When USAC
 discontinued the St. Paul project it placed emphasis on human re-
 sources development in the total system projects. Yet out of the
 thirty-three human services components conceptualized in Char-
 lotte, only one was implemented. Wichita Falls conceptualized
 thirty-five and implemented none.
 The Concept of Integrated Information Systems
 USAC considered integration to be the key in developing total
 municipal information systems. Two kinds of integration were pro-
 posed: operational integration, which would link logically related
 municipal processes normally divided by organizational or other
 barriers; and data integration, which would link nearly all municipal
 data to facilitate their use for both operations and management.
 At the time USAC started it was not clear whether such integrated
 systems could be built, so the USAC projects were in effect experi-
 ments to find out. Thus the first and most significant lesson learned
 on this issue was that integrated information systems can be built.
 Charlotte, for example, made major progress in integrating use of
 certain data across municipal departments. These accomplishments
 include integration of data on building characteristics for use by
 both the building inspection department and the fire department;
 integration of land parcel data for use by the fire, planning, building
 inspection, and public works departments; and integration of data
 on municipal rolling stock for use by the finance, fire, police, and
 public works departments.17 Wichita Falls also made substantial
 16. See Human Resources Development Subsystem: Final Project Report
 (St. Paul, Minn.: City of St. Paul and Aires Corporation, 1972); and Doug
 Hines, "St. Paul Subsystem: Anatomy of a Failure," Urban and Regional
 Information Systems Association Conference Proceedings, 1972, pp. 265-
 279.
 17. See Joseph R. Motto, Data Base Management m tne Charlotte Muni-
 cipal Information System: A Post-USAC Update" (Paper presented at the
 1977 Annual Conference of the Urban and Regional Information Systems
 Association, Kansas City, Mo., August 1977).
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 progress toward the goal of an integrated total system, and Long
 Beach and Dayton both built successful integrated subsystems.
 The degree of integration accomplished in USAC fell far short
 of expectations, however. This fact brings up the other major lessons
 about integrated information systems learned from USAC. Experi-
 ence has shown that the operational meaning of the USAC concept
 of integration is much more complex than anticipated.18 USAC
 assumed that integration would be achieved rather simply by de-
 veloping a few large data bases oriented around people, property,
 money, and personnel, and by linking them through common identi-
 fiers such as name, social security number, and property geocode.
 Real integration is technically more difficult to accomplish. The
 number of data bases actually required is five to ten times the num-
 ber anticipated by USAC, because the operating departments have
 differing demands regarding data security, hours of access, response
 time, backup, rapid recovery in the event of failure, and costs they
 can afford. The greater the number of data bases, the greater the
 difficulty of providing linkage among them.
 Integration also is difficult to accomplish because of several fea-
 tures of organizations. First, systems and operations are already
 linked. Systems are embedded in day-to-day operations; they are
 not merely adjuncts to them. People come to depend on systems,
 so problems with systems have both personnel and performance im-
 plications. Integration increases the complexity of systems, raising
 the propensity for problems. Second, some data integration already
 takes place in most organizations, but along established paths, either
 formal or informal. Imposing a new standardized data-sharing regi-
 men not only entails implementation of new procedure, but disrupts
 existing procedure and practice. Thus integration can only be ac-
 complished if complex existing relationships among data providers
 and users are acknowledged and taken into consideration in a new
 integration plan.
 Another lesson is that building integrated systems takes consider-
 ably more effort, time, and money than previously thought. The
 Dayton financial system illustrates the difference between planned
 18. Ibid. See also Donald Luria, "Success Depends on Transferability," in
 Urban and Regional Information Systems: Information Research for an Ur-
 ban Society (Claremont, Calif.: URISA, 1973), vol. 1, Papers from the
 Eleventh Annual Conference of URISA, August 28-31, 1973, pp. 186-93;
 and Hemmens, "Integrated Municipal Informations Concept."
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 and actual resource requirements for an integrated subsystem. It is
 a particularly good example because it encompasses nearly all the
 components of the finance subsystem and because all of them have
 been built. As table 7 shows, the Dayton subsystem took five times
 Table 7. Actual Resource Requirements for Building the Dayton Finance
 Subsystem Far Exceeded Plans
 I . ■ I. - I . , ! ■ ■
 Amount Actual
 Resources Planned Amount Spenta Overran
 Person-years effect 13.5 67.0 +396%
 Elapsed time to completion (years) 2.0 5.0 -f-150%
 Cost (in millions of dollars)
 a Represents cost in federally supplied money only.
 the planned effort (67 versus 13.45 person-years), two and one-half
 times the planned time (five versus two years), and one and one-half
 times the planned cost ($2.9 million versus $1.9 million). The ap-
 proximate per capita cost for Dayton's subsystem, $11.64, is high
 compared to $2-3 for "basic" finance systems developed by other
 cities (see table 8). Differences in capabilities of the systems, and
 Table 8. Cost for Cities with Financial Systems of Comparable
 "Basic" Comprehensiveness
 =i ni
 Approximate Approximate
 City
 Rockville,
 Fresno, Calif. 190,000 750,000*> 3.94
 Dayton, Ohio 245,000 2,900,000 11.64
 Detroit, Mich. 1,200,000 2,500,000 2.10
 New York, N.Y. 7,750,000
 Source: U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Fiscal Manage-
 ment Capacity Building (Washington, D.C., 1976).
 Note: All cities contain at least four basic capabilities: payroll, ledger and journal
 accounting, purchasing, and budget functions. Dayton's system goes considerably
 beyond the four basic functions.
 a New York's costs are only for contractors and are estimates since the project is
 not yet complete. The other cities' costs include some internal personnel costs.
 Fresno and Dayton costs are based upon detailed accounting for both direct and
 indirect costs.
 b These costs include the transfer contract plus Fresno's in-house staff costs; based
 on a telephone conversation with Dan Nolan, City of Fresno, August 1977.
 the additional costs of R&D for Dayton, contribute to this difference.
 It is significant to note that Fresno, which transferred the entire
 Dayton subsystem, spent only 25 percent of Dayton's development
 cost to transfer and install the system (table 8).19
 19. Dayton, Ohio, Project Completion Report.
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 The final lesson learned about integration is that the technology
 to support full integration is sophisticated and costly. The techno-
 logical package necessary to support a fully integrated information
 system as envisioned by USAC includes a third-generation, or later,
 computer (or computers) with minimum core capacity of 500 kilo-
 bytes and on-line storage of at least eight megabytes; complex data
 base management software costing as much as $20,000 per year to
 rent; sophisticated telecommunications capability; a data base ad-
 ministrator and systems programmer to handle data base activities;
 extensive data base documentation; and policies and procedures for
 data standardization. This package is generally within the reach of
 only the larger, more experienced cities, indicating that the potential
 number of cities that could develop fully integrated systems is
 limited at present. New advances in technology may in time change
 this condition.
 The Concept of Operations-Based Automation
 USAC proposed that data needed for municipal planning and
 management be gathered through ongoing data collecting activities
 of government operations. Earlier experiments with planning and
 management data banks had shown that data banks were difficult
 to keep updated, and that municipal planning and management
 functions alone could not justify the large front-end costs to develop
 these data banks. Operations-based, integrated systems offered the
 promise of economic data collection plus reliable and continuous
 updating.
 USAC showed that planning and management data can be gen-
 erated from integrated, operations-based systems. By using data
 from operating files on properties, building use, streets, utilities,
 municipal service delivery, and project costs, linked together ac-
 cording to geographic indicators such as blocks, census tracts,
 neighborhoods, political districts, and street segments, Wichita Falls
 has been able to conduct neighborhood analysis, determine the
 boundaries of urban renewal projects, select sites for municipal
 facilities, determine need for housing and conservation projects,
 prepare data for federal grant applications, handle zoning and sub-
 division requests, prepare city maps, and build its capital budget.20
 The other major lesson on operations-based automation is that
 the presence of data is only one criterion for successful management
 20. See Wichita Falls, Texas, Project Completion Report.
 336 POLICY ANALYSIS
 and planning data uses. The examples cited above are impressive,
 but they do not approach the uses of operations-based data predicted
 by USAC. The primary reason for this is that both planning and
 management lack the analytical staff needed to make extensive and
 imaginative use of the data. Top managers and department man-
 agers often are unaware of the data capabilities that exist. The
 other impediment to widespread planning and management use of
 operations-based data is the difficulty both managers and planners
 face in keeping track of the data available, ensuring that the data
 are current, and massaging the data to produce information. Top
 managers in particular are very constrained for time in most cities,
 so they will have a tendency to forego the possible benefits from
 using operations-based data for decision making if much time is
 required to assemble, verify, and massage the relevant, available
 data.21
 The Concept of the Prototype Development Process
 The USAC prototype development process included six steps:
 systems analysis, systems conceptualization, systems design, systems
 development, systems implementation, and systems evaluation. The
 analysis through development steps were to be performed compre-
 hensively and simultaneously for all components of the system, with
 implementation and evaluation following incrementally according
 to established priorities. This process was intended to ensure that
 the information requirements, the precedence ordering, the costs
 and benefits, and the technical requirements of all applications
 would be known before implementation priorities were set. The
 first lesson learned here was that across-the-board movement from
 systems analysis to systems development does not work. It proved
 to be cumbersome and costly and precluded the chance to get things
 implemented early in order to demonstrate benefits from the sys-
 tem. The mass of detailed data the cities collected during analysis
 and conceptualization was simply overwhelming, and the analysts
 came to consider these tasks wasteful of resources.22 Moreover, this
 21. Steven Ondraegus, "Urban Planning in Wichita Falls, Texas: One
 Year After USAC," Urban and Regional Information Systems Association
 Annual Conference Proceedings (Qaremont, Calif.: URISA, 1976), pp. 292-
 300.
 22. K. L. Kraemer et al., Systems Analysis in the USAC Cities (Washing-
 ton, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1972).
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 approach failed to recognize the learning benefits that accrue from
 early experience with the complete system-building process. The
 cities abandoned the across-the-board approach early, set their pri-
 orities by intuiting, and set to work designing and developing the
 applications they actually planned to implement.
 Another important lesson was that users must be considered more
 carefully in the process. It was found that users must adapt to each
 new increment before the next is implemented. In order to meet user
 needs satisfactorily, every implementation effort requires training
 and hand-holding of users and design modifications beyond what are
 originally anticipated. Also it was demonstrated that user involve-
 ment is extremely difficult to maintain with a protracted prototype
 development process. Key department personnel most valuable to
 the system building effort also were valuable to their departments,
 to whom they owed first allegiance; a situation that eventually made
 them unavailable. Added to the normally high incidence of depart-
 mental staff changes through promotion and turnover, this fact made
 it nearly impossible to sustain the necessary user involvement and
 interest in the process.
 Finally, USAC showed that underlying precedences in develop-
 ing prototype systems must be acknowledged. Integrated systems
 require that certain system components be developed and imple-
 mented before all others, since they act as foundations for the other
 systems. In USAC these systems were the geographic base file, the
 basic general ledger accounting system, and the basic personnel/
 payroll system. Although the USAC concepts recognized this notion
 of precedence relations, the prototype development process origin-
 ally proposed did not take this into account, and the projects found
 it necessary to abandon the process model to make progress on these
 basic components. Once these were implemented, further develop-
 ment and system integration tended to occur through opportunistic
 evolution as much as through careful planning.
 The Concept of Complete Documentation
 USAC hoped to facilitate development and transfer through com-
 plete, careful documentation. Unfortunately, the excessive docu-
 mentation requirement backfired. The tedious burden of documen-
 tation was onerous to the analysts, delaying their progress toward
 design and implementation, and actually made transfer more dif-
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 ficult. Taken together, US AC project documentation fills about
 seventy-two linear feet of shelf space. This sheer volume is a barrier
 to transfer because there is neither an interpretive guide to the mass
 of volumes nor a synthesis of what was built and what was learned.23
 The Concept of Systems and Subsystems Transfer
 The "bottom line" of the USAC program was supposed to be
 achieved when the prototypes were transferred to other cities, there-
 by advancing the state of information systems in cities by a whole
 generation.24 Widespread transfer would justify the cost of the
 program several times over. Despite this dream, not much physical
 transfer of USAC application software has occurred. There has been
 interest in transfer as expressed by inquiry visits and by requests for
 complete project documentation, but to date there are only fifteen
 known transfers from the whole project, with seven involving Day-
 ton's finance subsystem (see table 9). There has been no transfer of
 one of the total systems to another city.25
 Table 9. There Has Been Little Interest in Transfer of USAC Systems
 Wichita Long
 Charlotte Falls Dayton Beach
 Number of visits by other cities 39a 2 38 2
 Number of cities receiving
 documentation - 2 14 2
 Number of known transfers of
 one or more components 4 2 7b 2
 Number of known transfers of
 total system or subsystem - 1 -
 Source: Project completion reports and telephone conversations.
 * Charlotte had a total of sixty-seven outside organizations visit the project with
 transfer interests; some visited more than once.
 b These places transferred part or all of the finance subsystem.
 23. Two bibliographies have recently been released that may help provide
 guidance to the stack of USAC materials: Public Technology, Incorporated,
 Index to Municipal Information Systems Publications (Washington, D.C.:
 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1976); and Mary
 Young, Urban Information Systems: A Bibliography with Abstracts (Spring-
 field, Va.: National Technical Information Service, 1977).
 24. Our use of the word transfer is fairly liberal. We take transfer to refer
 to any movement of a technological development to another use or to the
 same use in another setting. This contrasts with Baer, Johnson, and Merrow
 ("Government-Sponsored Demonstrations," p. 952), who use transfer for the
 former case and the word diffusion for the latter.
 25. More transfers than this may have occurred, but we have been unable
 to get data indicating this is the case.
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 A major lesson from USAC is that integration makes transfer
 especially difficult and problematic.26 There are several reasons for
 this. First, integrated applications are larger than normal applica-
 tions. For example, the Long Beach public safety subsystem con-
 tains 146 programs. Systems of such size and complexity simply are
 too difficult for many cities to adopt. Advanced technical capabilities
 and staffs required for integrated systems may not be available in
 many cities. Second, integrated systems must be transferred sub-
 stantially in whole. Cities cannot simply select the parts of the sys-
 tem they would like to transfer, because the components are de-
 signed to operate as a system. This places a cost burden on those
 transferrees that must implement more than they actually need.
 Finally, as integration increases so does the need for city agencies
 to share data, to provide data needed by other agencies, and to agree
 to collect data only once at the most logical place. If city agencies
 are unwilling to cooperate, transfer potential is lessened.
 Transfer is more feasible when applications are small, standard,
 simple, and somewhat independent. This is suggested most clearly
 by the experience with transfers of the Dayton finance subsystem.
 The Dayton subsystem is a relatively simple batch system with clear-
 ly defined and separable modules, and in part as a result of these
 characteristics the subsystem has been transferred as often as all
 the other systems combined. Even allowing for the popularity of
 finance applications, the Dayton transfer experience overshadows
 those of the other USAC cities.
 The Concept of the Consortium Approach
 USAC's consortium approach, which was based on the systems
 model of management in defense and aerospace industries, assumed
 that proper planning, management, and control would unite a di-
 verse group of people and organizations and get them to produce a
 single, unified product. In fact, the consortium arrangement was
 fraught with problems, and eventually dissolved. The USAC Com-
 mittee drifted apart two years before the USAC projects ended, the
 26. Further discussion of problems inherent in computer application
 transfer can be found in K. L. Kraemer, "Local Government, Information
 Systems, and Technology Transfer: Evaluation of Some Common Assertions
 about Application Transfer," Public Administration Review 37 (July/ August
 1977): 368-82; Hemmens, "Integrated Municipal Informations Concept";
 and Luria, 'Transferability."
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 federal administrator of the USAC program changed four times in
 six years, the universities never became viable members of the local
 consortia, and the interconsortium panel was discontinued after only
 two years.
 The major lesson on this from USAC is that the systems model of
 organization may be inappropriate for such inherently complex ef-
 forts that involve people and organizations with conflicting goals
 and interests. The federal agencies purported to support USAC be-
 cause of their interest in improving local governments. In fact, each
 agency had quite different expectations, incentives, and levels of
 commitment. Consequently, they withdrew their support when the
 cities' definition of improvement proved to be different from their
 own. The cities purportedly were interested in developing systems
 that would meet both federal and local data needs and that would
 serve as prototypes for other cities to adopt. In fact, the cities were
 interested only in their data needs and in development rather than
 in research into prototypes. This created continuous federal-local
 tension over project objectives.
 The local consortia also had difficulty cooperating. The cities
 wanted the systems tailored to local needs; the consultant firms
 wanted to develop generalized systems appropriate for commercial
 transfer to other cities. The cities were supposed to be in charge, but
 they lacked the technical expertise. Thus the systems firms made
 nearly all technical decisions and many substantive decisions as a
 result of these technical choices. The consortium arrangement
 placed the universities in a double bind. The universities were sup-
 posed to be both friendly inside advisers and objective outside critics.
 Yet the cities and the systems firms were reluctant to make the uni-
 versity teams privy to inside information when as outside critics
 they could easily use inside information against the project staff.
 The universities were forced to choose either the advisory or the
 critical role. The critical role shut the university out of project
 affairs, while the advisory role precluded candid criticism.
 Perhaps the underlying reason for the problems that plagued the
 consortia was the unfailing belief of USAC officials in the consortia
 model and their rigid adherence to it in spite of its failings. Conflicts
 and problems were thought to be due to human failings and insti-
 tutional rigidities among the consortia members rather than due to
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 the possible inappropriateness of this aerospace model for organiza-
 tion.27
 THE SYSTEMS APPROACH REAPPRAISED
 USAC's administrative structure, its research and development
 processes, and its concepts for IMIS were all based upon what is
 often called the systems approach.28 This concept so pervaded
 USAC that a better term for it would be "systems consciousness."
 Systems consciousness is predicated on a basic faith in technology
 and the belief that technological progress is best accomplished
 through a systematic research, development, and implementation
 effort. In the aerospace industry, where USAC found many of its
 roots, systems consciousness is characterized by the use of large-
 scale federal funding for research and development of advanced
 technology to demonstrate through prototypes the potential benefits
 from full-scale application of this technology and, thereby, to stim-
 ulate widespread diffusion and use of the technology.29 In USAC,
 27. See George Hemmens, "The Consortium Model and Evaluation Re-
 search Design in USAC," in Urban and Regional Information Systems Asso-
 ciation Proceedings (Claremont, Calif.: URISA, 1973), pp. 283-97; and
 Barry Weilar, USAC Experience.
 28. The term systems approach can refer to three aspects of civilian prob-
 lem solving, which we call technical, analytical, and procedural. Technical
 solutions are developments of hardware or software that answer particular,
 circumscribed problems: how to heat a building with less energy, how to
 find buried pipes beneath city streets without digging them up, how to pick
 up garbage from curbsides mechanically. Analytical solutions are applica-
 tions of predictive and quantitative analytical techniques to answering ques-
 tions about the present or the future. These have been most widely seen as
 the various simulation and modeling efforts that have been applied to urban
 growth, housing, transportation, utility planning, and logistics management
 (such as vehicle routing). Procedural solutions are applications of the method-
 ology of the systems-oriented agencies that have resulted in successful mis-
 sion accomplishment from goal definition, through development and manu-
 facturing, to deployment and adoption. USAC is an example of the technical
 and procedural aspects of application of the systems approach: technical, in
 that computer technology was to break down bottlenecks in flow of informa-
 tion from source to end users; procedural, in that design, development, and
 deployment of the systems would take place through the systematic method-
 ology used successfully in the aerospace industry.
 29. We speak here of government-sponsored research and development in
 aerospace, not projects funded with private capital, such as civilian aircraft
 and private satellite development. However, much of the technology that goes
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 the technology was computing, the advanced application was IMIS,
 and the targets for diffusion were cities.
 Two main assumptions of systems consciousness were found in
 USAC: that it is possible to build from scratch totally new, full-
 scale systems that will be effective but not necessarily cost-effective
 for the initial development sites; and that, once built, the effective-
 ness of these systems will be so great that they will be widely trans-
 ferred at reasonable cost and thereby achieve cost-effectiveness for
 the original R&D investment. The experience of USAC suggests that
 these assumptions were too simplistic. USAC failed to develop the
 large-scale, integrated, operations-based municipal information sys-
 tems it conceived.
 Three explanations can be offered for this failure. First, it can be
 argued that the systems approach simply does not work as purported
 in any situation. This is not a particularly compelling argument,
 since there are many examples of application of the approach that
 have achieved remarkable success. In particular, the organization
 of the American manned spaceflight effort leading to the moon
 flights stands out as a notable accomplishment in use of the systems
 approach.
 A second and more reasonable explanation is that the systems
 approach works well only in the comparatively straightforward en-
 vironment of aerospace hardware development or of other explicitly
 technical tasks.80 When the prototypes for development are physical
 into civilian and private sector aerospace activity is usually developed out of
 military and national space programs anyway. Non-aerospace applications
 of this model can be seen in numerous cases: ¿he development of the nuclear
 freighter Savannah; the mechanized refuse collection machine Godzilla in
 Scottsdale, Arizona; the fast breeder reactor program; personal rapid transit
 system demonstration at Morgantown, West Virginia; and various experi-
 mental waste processing facilities, to name just a few. See Rand Corporation,
 Analysis of Federally-Funded Demonstration Projects: Final Report (Santa
 Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, R-1926-DOC, 1976).
 30. There has been a good deal of debate about the efficacy of the analy-
 tical aspect of the systems approach in dealing with social or administrative
 problems. Rational, systems analysis applied to policymaking had its heydey
 in the mid-1960s, began to wane in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and has
 undergone a series of ups and downs since, drawing criticism and praise,
 depending on the bias of the commentator. For further reading assessing the
 applications of systems analysis, rational analysis, and policy analysis to
 social problems, see Richard Nelson, "Intellectualizing About the Moon-
 Ghetto Metaphor: A Study of the Current Malaise of Rational Analysis of
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 systems such as aircraft or spacecraft, the objectives are relatively
 clear and the requirements for development can be agreed on by all
 concerned. There is much history and existing knowledge to draw
 upon. More important, there is usually only one client (the federal
 government), for the products of these systems, and more often than
 not the client is a single agency with clear expectations for its pro-
 grams and well-developed relationships with its contractors. The
 USAC projects, on the other hand, took place in a complex environ-
 ment involving federal government, local government, consulting
 firms, and universities. The prototypes for development, although
 rationally described in concept, entailed a great number of un-
 knowns, and there was no history or experience to provide assis-
 tance. Objectives varied among the participants, and even the cities
 vacillated in their desires for what the end product should look like.
 There was no unifying and directing force such as a single client, so
 it was impossible to center the activities of USAC sufficiently to
 allow the systems approach to function. Without a systematic and
 stable environment in which to operate, the systems approach was
 doomed.
 The final, and perhaps most important, explanation for the fail-
 ure of the systems approach in USAC is insufficient resources. Re-
 sources here refers primarily to money, but other resources such as
 technical assistance and high-quality staff are important as well.
 The major difference between the environment of federally funded
 aerospace development and federally funded development in muni-
 cipal information systems is not organizational and not technical;
 it is financial. The systems approach works well in aerospace in part
 because it has been given every opportunity to succeed. USAC spent
 $26 million over seven years to develop prototype information sys-
 tems to link together local government data for use in planning,
 management, and operations. Congress allocated $462 million for
 1978 alone to continue work on the prototype of the B-l bomber,
 and that is only one project out of hundreds over the past forty
 Social Programs" Policy Sciences 5 (1974): 375-414; Ida Hoos, Systems
 Analysis in Social Policy: A Critical Review (London: Institute of Economic
 Affairs, 1969); C. West Churchman, Challenge to Reason (New York:
 McGraw Hill, 1968); and Gary Brewer, Politics, Bureaucrats, and the Con-
 sultants: A Critique of Urban Problem Solving (New York: Basic Books,
 1973).
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 years.81 We do not intend to criticize the aerospace industry or the
 military, but to point out the enormous difference in resources that
 separates projects like USAC from the projects they are modeled
 after. K USAC had been provided a proportional level of funding
 equivalent to that provided projects in defense and space, it might
 have had a very different set of outcomes. Unfortunately, it is im-
 possible to know at this point.
 CONCLUSIONS
 From a technical standpoint, the USAC program demonstrated a
 mix of shortfalls and accomplishments, like nearly all large and in-
 novative projects. We have explored examples of both. The short-
 falls of USAC are significant. USAC did not succeed in its goal of
 developing and transferring complete, integrated municipal infor-
 mation systems. The concept of an integrated municipal information
 system proved to be an elusive and difficult concept to bring into
 reality. What began with great ambition ended with automation and
 integration of some municipal operations and marginal contribution
 to municipal planning and management. In this respect USAC is not
 unique among ambitious programs either at the local or at the state
 and federal levels.
 On the other hand, USAC accomplished more than a cursory
 glance might reveal. USAC demonstrated that integrated systems
 can be built. It also demonstrated that operations-based systems can
 effectively provide data for planning and management. And obvi-
 ously, the USAC projects themselves had a profound impact on
 development of computing in the USAC site cities. But another im-
 pact of USAC is not commonly recognized. This is the fact that
 31. The total civilian R&D federal budget for 1978 is, by comparison,
 $8.6 billion. The paucity of funds granted to accomplish very ambitious
 projects is discussed in Roland L. Warren, Stephen Rose, and Alan Bergun-
 der, The Structure of Urban Reform (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books,
 1974), p. 172. We feel it appropriate to note that some critics of USAC,
 participants in the program, have argued in discussions with us that the
 funding for USAC was sufficient but misapplied. The problems, they assert,
 were that the money was too spread out (that is, it may have been better to
 place $26 million in one or two sites), and that the "best" sites were not
 chosen for development. The former seems a restatement of our conclusion;
 the latter, of course, cannot be evaluated since it is not clear at this point
 that any of the applicants for the grants had categorically superior capability.
 And if they had, they probably would not have been appropriate as demon-
 stration sites for promoting diffusion.
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 USAC dramatically changed the way many local governments con-
 ceived of their information systems, and this change is reflected in
 the directions that continue to appear in the field. This is true not
 only in the USAC sites, but in many of the cities that originally re-
 sponded to the USAC RFP and in cities that had nothing to do with
 USAC. The concept of integrated municipal information systems
 significantly influenced subsequent information systems develop-
 ment in local governments in the United States and in some cases
 abroad.82 The USAC concepts for IMIS continue to appear in docu-
 ments about existing and proposed systems in cities that never were
 formally connected to USAC. Thus the most significant accomplish-
 ment of USAC was its impact as a catalyst and a vision for the
 general development of urban information systems in the United
 States.
 Beyond its technical aspects, USAC was a political and cultural
 experiment, and its failure in this regard may be its most important
 failure, from a policy perspective. Politically, USAC was an attempt
 to get cities to solve a problem the federal agencies had been unable
 to solve themselves, despite a decade of individual agency experi-
 mentation with functionally oriented information systems. The
 problem was developing flexible and comprehensive systems that
 would support continually changing intergovernmental needs for
 information used to justify, plan, manage, and evaluate federal ur-
 ban programs. The federal strategy was to "push" reform of local
 government information systems by supplying standard prototypes
 that all cities could adopt. Once adopted nationwide, these systems
 would not only serve federal information needs. The federal agencies
 would encourage adoption of the systems by establishing informa-
 tion standards for the local governments to meet and by providing
 financial incentives for the local governments to adopt the proto-
 types that would meet the standards.
 The federal strategy broke down, however. The prototypes proved
 more difficult, costly, and time-consuming to develop than antici-
 pated, thus discouraging both the cities, with their short-term ob-
 jectives of improving information management, and the federal
 agencies, with their long-term objectives of developing effective in-
 tergovernmental information sharing networks. The demand for
 32. This conclusion is based on a review of conference proceedings of the
 Urban and Regional Information Systems Association (XJRISA) since 1970
 and on interviews conducted by the authors in forty-two cities.
 346 POLICY ANALYSIS
 systems to assist in integrated information management in local
 governments, although real, was far too weak to pull further devel-
 opment along once the high cost and long time-frame for prototype
 development became apparent. And the concept of integrated sys-
 tems itself proved to have detractors as well as promoters, once the
 likely political effects of integration of information within cities and
 between governmental levels became visible on the horizon.
 Culturally, USAC was an attempt to mesh widely divergent ex-
 pectations, incentives, and levels of commitment among federal,
 local, and private agencies to support and implement its strategy.
 Like the political experiment, the cultural experiment failed because
 of serious miscalculations. Simultaneous involvement of so many
 agencies with such divergent interests proved unworkable. Most of
 the federal agencies were interested in the downstream effects of the
 IMIS projects on intergovernmental information flows, and they be-
 came extremely impatient with the implementation problems of the
 cities, which delayed the achievement of these effects. Local govern-
 ments were interested in the immediate effects of the projects on
 cost-efficiency within departments where the technology was ap-
 plied, and they became frustrated with the impacts of continual de-
 velopment time extensions on cost-efficiency gains.
 The private software development firms were interested in the
 potential of the projects for commercial transfer elsewhere, and they
 felt their interests being thwarted as the cities pressed them for im-
 mediate, tailored results that reduced the potential for commercial
 transfer available from generalized designs. Also, the withdrawal
 of active support by federal agencies signaled to the private firms
 the lessened likelihood of funding for nationwide transfer of the
 prototypes. Given limited resources of all kinds (knowledge, skilled
 people, time, money) the divergent interests of the various agencies
 could not be met within schedule. Moreover, the governing mech-
 anisms of USAC - the federal consortium, the local consortia, and
 the interconsortium panel - all lacked the means of ameliorating
 the differing interests and developing consensus about more focused
 goals. Divergent agency goals also meant that concepts of project
 success varied widely, making evaluation of project status problem-
 atic and dependent upon who one talked to. Evaluating the objective
 status of the projects proved difficult, which tended to focus evalu-
 ation efforts on a single criterion that everyone could agree upon:
 "Are the systems getting built?"
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 Thus the narrow goal of completing the IMIS modules became
 the focus of the USAC program, and this goal was less than satisfac-
 tory to all parties. It coincided with the interests of the local con-
 tractors who were struggling to complete their part of the emaci-
 ated program, but it did not serve the interests of the federal agencies
 that had initiated the broader USAC program in order to meet their
 own goals. When the goals changed, the interest and involvement
 of nine of the federal agencies waned, leaving HUD to close-out the
 program.
 Policy Implications
 Considered as an example of public policy in the development
 and diffusion of new technology applied to intergovernmental prob-
 lems, USAC yields several policy lessons. First, and in keeping with
 other findings about federally sponsored demonstration projects,
 USAC demonstrated the difficulty of encouraging development and
 diffusion of innovation simply through supply-push strategy. Before
 USAC and since, local governments have developed computing ap-
 plications largely on their own, in response to their own perceptions
 of need, and in their own increments. The IMIS concept, while in-
 triguing and still promising, was such a dramatic departure from this
 traditional development pattern of local governments that it was
 difficult for them to adapt. Also, while the need for more effective
 information management technology is obvious in the general sense,
 local governments differ considerably from one another, depending
 on size and locality. Thus a specific package of information manage-
 ment technology is not likely to be in universal demand. Future
 federally sponsored efforts to develop transferable technology for
 use in local governments should be predicated on well-researched
 and understood demand characteristics of the local government
 market.
 Second, USAC's strategy of combining very basic research and
 advanced development should be avoided. USAC intended first to
 delineate all the information systems flows in a city and then to
 design an integrated system to manage and coordinate those flows.
 The task of defining all the information flows in itself proved to be
 a major undertaking, and the results of that task indicated that some
 of the grandiose concepts of IMIS simply were not possible, not
 practical, or not yet understood. Yet the purpose of this research
 was to provide the framework for design, not to call the overall plan
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 into question. Thus development proceeded in spite of the newly
 discovered magnitude of the task and the uncertainty of success.
 Future projects of this character should be preceded by careful, ob-
 jective, and sufficiently funded feasibility studies before any efforts
 at systems analysis and design begin.
 Third, it should now be apparent that all highly technological in-
 novation-development efforts are expensive - usually much more
 expensive than anticipated. USAC's money was not only inadequate
 to its task, but was spread out over six sites, thus losing any econ-
 omies of scale that might have been available. Although it is true
 that simply throwing money at major problems will not solve them,
 it also is true that major problems cannot be tackled successfully
 without sufficient funds. Future projects of this kind should be pre-
 ceded by much more detailed analysis and projection of likely costs,
 taking into account the past experiences of other development proj-
 ects that are fraught with missed deadlines, overruns, and organiza-
 tional problems. Perhaps a multiplier should be applied to all final
 estimates, simply to provide an indication of possible final costs if
 things do not go well.
 Finally, more care should be taken in constructing the political
 and organizational mechanisms that support such programs. Ob-
 viously no agency will be involved in a program in which it sees no
 payoff for itself or in which it has no mandate to perform. Projects
 and the organizational arrangements used to execute them must be
 formulated in a manner that allows development of clear statements
 of each party's expectations, and the timetable within which those
 expectations are to be met. Then the programs should be organized
 in such a way that each party's interests become individual goals that
 are the responsibility of the overall organization. Without such an
 arrangement, the potentially valuable consortium arrangements of
 USAC will never stand a chance. As soon as the goals of the pro-
 gram are narrowed or obscured, those who feel disenfranchised will
 abandon the effort and leave it without support or direction.
 It is not our intention to argue that organizational innovations for
 managing federal-local programs, the consortium approach in par-
 ticular, are to be avoided. On the contrary, we feel that much can
 be gained from experimenting with ways to integrate various agency
 and government interests in single programs. Much more attention
 must be paid to maintaining the interests of the various participants,
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 however. While problems existed within the local consortia and in
 the implementation of IMIS, these could have been worked out with
 time and resources. The real failure of USAC was the failure of the
 federal member agencies - the USAC Committee - to find a basis
 for continuing to cooperate in implementing the program they had
 jointly initiated. The USAC program was a house of cards, heavily
 dependent on the leadership, support, and planning of the USAC
 Committee. When the committee collapsed, the whole USAC pro-
 gram was doomed to collapse as well.
